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gratefully acknowledged.I. Introduction*
During the 1970s and early 1980s Mexico, like many other Latin
American countries, relied to a large extent on foreign capital
in financing public and private expenditures. While the annual
inflow of debt was always larger than that of foreign direct in-
vestment (fdi), the relative importance of both types of capital
varied substantially over the 1970-81 period. The ratio of debt
over fdi inflows was as low as 2.6 in the 1970-74 period. It in-
creased to 6.7 during the years 1975-77 and averaged 5.0 in 1978-
81 . In the same three sub-periods, the real growth rate of gross
domestic product dropped from an average of 6.8 per cent to 4.4
per cent before it increased again to 8.4 per cent. Hence, rela-
tively good economic performance coincided with relatively large
fdi inflows.
Both empirical observations, different capital structures and
growth records, may in fact be interrelated. This hypothesis
refers to a choice-theoretic model which analyses the interna-
tional transfer of capital on the basis of an agent-principal
approach (Lachler, 1985). It is shown that transfer negotiations
between foreign lenders or investors (principals) and the author-
ities in the recipient country (agent) can result in a first-best
"cooperative" or a second-best "non-cooperative" equilibrium. The
impact of capital inflows on economic performance of the recipi-
ent country depends on which of both regimes is realized. In a
non-cooperative situation, the borrower fails to precommit him-
self credibly to a certain investment behaviour. Under such con-
ditions the choice between equity and debt finance may involve a
risk-return trade-off between income stability and expected
growth. Due to the risk sharing with foreign investors a higher
proportion of equity inflows reduces the variability of the
agent's domestic absorption. At the same time, incentives to
generate domestic savings are supposed to be weaker than in the
* Comments of Peter Nunnenkamp are gratefully acknowledged.
The data for the capital structure come from Table 2 and growth
rates are taken from Anuario Estadistico published by the Se-
cretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto.case of debt finance. Consequently, future growth prospects are
diminished.
The non-cooperative case has been considered as typical for prin-
cipal-agent relations in the recent past (Lachler, Nunnenkamp,
1987). However, the hypothesis on economic performance effects
derived under such conditions seems to conflict with Mexico's
favourable growth experience in periods with relatively large
fdi inflows. The apparent contradiction may be due to government
policies towards different types of capital inflows. Typically
government interventions not only influence the total amount of
capital inflows, but also its structural composition. Indirectly
capital inflow regulations are thus likely to influence economic
performance as well. Moreover, government interventions may have
a direct impact on the growth effects of different capital in-
flows. Most importantly, the efficiency of investments financed
through equity and debt inflows may be affected by regulations.
In the following, the predictions of the principal-agent model on
the effects of different capital inflows on economic performance
in Mexico are subjected to an empirical test. Section II outlines
the choice-theoretic model and clarifies whether transfer negoti-
ations yielded a cooperative or non-cooperative equilibrium in
the case of Mexico. Section III analyses how Mexican policies
affected the structure of capital inflows over the 1973-87 period
and discusses the effects of regulations on the investment behav-
iour of the agent. In Section IV the impact of different types of
capital inflows on key macroeconomic variables is tested empiri-
cally. The results are interpreted within the agent-principal
framework. The final section provides some policy conclusions.
II. Theoretical Framework
1. The Basic Model
The relationship between foreign financing and domestic savings
and investment is the subject of a long debate in the .literatureon development finance. Most empirical studies concluded that an
additional Dollar of foreign capital increases total saving by
less than one Dollar . However, previous research focussed on
distinguishing the effects of private versus public transfers and
aid versus non-concessional external finance. Typically, the
distinction between debt versus fdi inflows which figures promi-
nently in the context of the following principal-agent model was
not considered.
Hypotheses on the impact of different types of capital inflows on
economic performance in Mexico can be derived from the following
principal-agent framework. In the underlying model (Lachler 1985;
Lachler, Nunnenkamp, 1987) the capital transfer between the lend-
ing or investor (principal) and the recipient country (agent) is
typically characterized by an informational asymmetry: Once the
money is transferred, the principal does not know which proporti-
on the agent invests in income generating activities. He merely
observes total output which is not only a function of realized
investment but also of random variables. As the agent allocates
the transferred resources between consumption and investment the
following disincentive (moral hazard) problems arise:
- In the case of equity participation, the agent can be expected
to invest a smaller share of domestic absorption compared to a
situation where foreign resources would be available as a gift.
Since the principal is entitled to a predetermined share of
future output, the agent may improve his own welfare position
by shifting domestic absorption to current consumption.
- In the case of debt finance the principal is entitled to a
fixed sum of debt service payments. Relative to a gift-transfer
the agent will choose riskier projects. This is because it is
favourable for him to raise the variance of returns from in-
vestments in order to maximize his own welfare at the expense
of the principal.
For an overview of empirical studies which measured the effects
of foreign capital on domestic savings, domestic investment and
economic growth, see Sharma (1983) .In both cases moral hazard of the agent threatens to reduce the
expected gains of the principal. Assuming that principals behave
rationally, they anticipate the agent's behaviour and modify the
terms under which the transfer is made. The agent who receives
foreign capital under these harder conditions is then forced to
behave in a non-cooperative manner.
The aforementioned disincentive problems may be overcome, if the
agent were able to precommit himself credibly to a certain
investment behaviour. In such a cooperative environment the model
hypothesizes that the investment response (I) to a transfer of
foreign capital (T) obeys the following pattern:
(1) dI/dT| i (dI/dT| , dI/dT| ) ,with 0 <. dI/dT| <. 1
AID Equity DEBT AID
According to (1), the recipient country invests a relatively lar-
ger share if the transfer involves future repayment obligations.
However, if the transfer negotiations result in a non-cooperative
solution, the change in domestic investment after an increased
equity inflow may be negative, while more external debt always
leads to more investment. The capital inflows are expected to
obey the following pattern: • ,
(2) dI/dT| ^ dI/dT| <, dI/dT| with 0 <, dI/dT| £ 1
Equity Aid Debt Aid
According to the model the pattern of coefficient values - as
given in (1) and (2) for investment - also holds for changes in
economic growth and domestic savings (DS) in response to in-
creased transfers. Real economic growth is assumed to be a stoch-
astic function of investment. In the case of domestic savings the
response to an aid inflow is bounded by -1 £ dDS/dT| £ 0
Aid
2. The Transfer Negotiations in the Case of Mexico
The expected impact of capital inflows on the agent's economic
performance differs according to the transfer regime. Hence, it
This results from the definition of domestic savings which is
DS = I-T.is important to get an idea whether Mexico engaged in cooperative
or non-cooperative relations with foreign suppliers of capital.
It depends on the perception of the agent's investment behaviour
by the principal, whether or not a cooperative equilibrium is
achieved. The agent may signal that he is prepared to engage in
cooperative relations. The model suggests that high investment
ratios, the concentration of investments in low-risk projects,
and successful mobilization of domestic savings may provide such
signals. However, unless the institutional framework of transfer
negotiations allows for a credible precommitment to a certain
investment behaviour, the outcome of transfer negotiations ulti-
mately depends on the principal's expectations on the agent's
future economic course. The principal decides on the terms of the
capital transfer. This in turn determines the type of equilibrium
reached.
Ideally, the results of Mexico's transfer negotiations with for-
eign investors are thus to be assessed by evaluating the terms of
fdi contracts. While this information is not available, it seems
justified to conclude that Mexico reached a cooperative relation-
ship with foreign investors. A positive and significant Pearson-
correlation coefficient (0.89) between fdi inflows and the public
investment ratio indicates that the Mexican government did not
abstain from complementary investments over the 1970-85 period.
Moreover, increases in public investment outlays cannot be attri-
buted to reductions in private investment . In other words Mexico
behaved cooperatively over the whole period. If foreign investors
would have supplied their investment capital at non-cooperative
terms, Mexico would have been better off showing also a non-
cooperative behaviour.
In contrast to fdi, non-cooperative relations are likely to per-
sist in the case of debt finance. As concerns the riskiness of
investments, Mexico's behaviour was not suited to achieve a co-
Over the 1970-85 period the Pearson-correlation coefficient
between the public and the private investment ratio is positive
(0.21).operative equilibrium. In general, activities which generate for-
eign exchange and conform to the assumed comparative advantage of
Mexico may be supposed to be the least risky for foreign princi-
pals . Actually, however, debt was concentrated in rather inward-
oriented sectors which accounted for 60 per cent of Mexican debt,
but less than 30 per cent of exports in 1980. On the other hand,
the manufacturing sector which received only 40 per cent of debt
inflows generated nearly three quarters of total exports.
Within the manufacturing sector the importance of highly human-
capital intensive industries is noteworthy. Measuring the im-
portance of industries by their value added, six human-capital
intensive industries accounted for 30 per cent of total value
added in the manufacturing sector (Table A3). Human-capital in-
tensive industries absorbed 84 per cent of private and more than
97 per cent of public foreign debt accruing to total manufactur-
ing. Human-capital intensive industries do certainly not conform
to Mexico's assumed comparative advantage. The relative poor
export performance of highly human-capital intensive industries
added to the riskiness for foreign lenders. In 1980 six human-
capital intensive industries exported only 15.1 per cent of total
manufacturing exports.
The relatively risky use of foreign credits in Mexico induced the
principals to supply foreign debt finance at non-cooperative
terms. Over the period 1977-81, interest rate spreads above LIBOR
amounted to an average of 1.13 percentage points in the case of
Mexico. The average spread for three indebted Asian developing
countries which experienced no serious debt problems was only
0.85 percentage points above LIBOR over the same period (Nunnen-
kamp, Junge, 1985, p. 57). Apparently, foreign creditors con-
sidered Mexico relatively more risky requiring a higher interest
rate spread.
The availability of foreign exchange is a precondition for debt
service payments. Investments which do not conform to Mexico's
comparative advantage may well be profitable in the short-run.
They are nevertheless fairly risky. Unexpected policy shifts
may significantly reduce the profitability of such investments.The non-cooperative behaviour of foreign lenders is also evident
from the shift to short-term credits. The share of short-term
credits in total foreign Mexican debt rose from 14 per cent in
1978 to 32 per cent in 1981. This indicates that commercial banks
were concerned about Mexico's ability to repay. They preferred
short-term commitments, because this gave them more flexibility
2
to reduce their engagement if Mexico's prospects turned sour .
Moreover, the share of undisbursed commitments in total commit-
ments decreased. Considering private lenders only, this ratio
dropped from 13 per cent in 1978 to 2 per cent in 1982 . This
points to a non-cooperative relationship as well: Foreign princi-
pals were worried about Mexico's credibility and did not guaran-
tee Mexico access to future credits.
III. Government Policies and Capital Inflows 1973-87
1. The Relevance of the Regulative Framework
Mexico achieved a cooperative relationship in the case of fdi in-
flows but faced a non-cooperative situation in the case of debt
finance. From the simultaneous existence of two different trans-
fer regimes it can be concluded that both, debt and fdi inflows,
should have a more favourable impact on investment than aid in-
flows. However, the relative influence of debt versus fdi is left
indeterminate. Furthermore, the simultaneous existence of co-
operative and non-cooperative relations conflicts with the model
assumptions according to which capital inflows are perfectly
fungible (Lachler, 1985). That is why government policies come
into focus.
Malaysia, Rep. of Korea, Thailand.
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In a cooperative situation the credible commitment of the agent
to invest the funds productively would make the shortening of
maturities superfluous and even counterproductive.
If public principals are included the reduction is less pro-
nounced (17 per cent to 9 per cent). Apparently, public insti-
tutions are more willing to provide credit even if the agent
behaves in a non-cooperative manner.The government can limit the fungibility of capital inflows by
regulations which influence the use and the efficiency of foreign
capital inflows. The way the government determines the allocation
of foreign capital inflows is likely to differ between the vari-
ous types of external finance. The government agent can freely
dispose of resources directly transferred to state agencies and
directly determines the efficiency of foreign aid and public debt
for example. In the case of private debt and foreign direct in-
vestment, the government's influence is less visible but may be
of similar importance. Regulations may reduce the attractiveness
of certain sectors for fdi and modify the incentives of the reci-
pients of foreign capital as to how to use the resources trans-
ferred. The ranking of the economic effects is thus likely to be
affected by the degree and nature of interventions concerning the
transfer of foreign resources. Against this background, we pro-
ceed by evaluating government regulations which influenced capi-
tal inflows to Mexico in the 1973-87 period.
2. The Regulation of Capital Inflows
a. Direct Foreign Investment
The "Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign In-
vestment" (LIE), which came into effect in May 1973, is still the
most important piece of legislation affecting the inflow of fdi.
Its impact on fdi inflows has, however, changed over time due to
a more liberal application in recent years.
The LIE requires foreign investors to register their planned
investments and seek for approval. The approving commission
(CNIE) decides upon the proposal according to a catalogue of
vague criteria. Among other things it is evaluated whether fdi
projects displace Mexican companies which are working satis-
factorily and whether they provide the Mexican economy with new
technology. Annual payments of royalty and profit remittances are
subject to foreign exchange availability and limited up to 15 per
cent of the equity capital. The income tax on dividends to for-
eign residents may be prohibitive where no double taxation agree-merits exist. In 1983 the tax rose from 21 to 55 per cent (Metra,
1985, p. 281).
The legislation also regulates the industries open to fdi and the
degree of foreign equity participation in fdi projects. Economic
activities being reserved exclusively for the Mexican state in-
clude petroleum exploration and refining as well as electric
energy generation. As petroleum exploration and refining boomed
in the 1970s, one of the fastest growing sectors was closed for
fdi . Industries such as the exploitation of timber resources,
insurance and road transportation are restricted to enterprises
2
wholly owned by Mexicans . With respect to other industries the
investment law generally requires all new fdi as well as the en-
largement of existing foreign firms to be 51 per cent Mexican-
owned. Hence, fdi is made less attractive for multinational firms
which want to ensure tight control of their subsidiaries in order
to implement their global strategy. Particularly multinationals
employing advanced technologies can be expected to refrain from
investments in Mexico or to transfer only "second-best" technolo-
gies.
Exceptions to the general 51/49 rule exist in both directions. On
one hand, foreigners must not hold more than 40 per cent of firms
producing automobile parts, for example. On the other hand, firms
exporting at least 80 per cent of their production and being
located at the border or in in-bond locations may be wholly owned
by foreigners . Small and medium-size foreign firms may also have
In the period 1977-81 petroleum exploration in real terms ex-
panded by 25.1 per cent annually, while the real growth rate of
the manufacturing sector - in which most fdi is concentrated
was 8.4 per cent.
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No foreign share holding is allowed in the nationalized banking
institutions since 1982.
According to the CNIE "maquiladora" investments are included in
the data on fdi approvals. However, some doubts seem justified.
In 1986 the number of establishments in the maquiladora indus-
try increased by 198. Assuming that foreign and national firms
grew at constant proportions from 1985 to 1986, 62 per cent or
123 were of foreign origin. However, the CNIE approved only 37
new enterprises and 20 new establishments in 1986 {CNIE, 1988a,
p. 67). Hence, even if all new fdi were of the maquiladora
type a difference of 66 has to explained.10
fully owned subsidiaries without going through the full approval
procedure of the CNIE . Furthermore, a foreign majority holding
may be permitted on a case by case basis, if the fdi is in the
national interest.
The legislative framework gives the authorities considerable
scope to decide upon fdi inflows at their own discretion. This
creates uncertainty for the applying firm and implies additional
costs as the bargaining process with the CNIE binds financial and
intellectual resources. Arbitrariness can not guarantee that the
most productive foreign investments are realized, since the bar-
gaining power of foreign investors does not necessarily coincide
with efficient production. Similarly, investors which succeeded
in circumventing the regulations need not to be the most effi-
cient ones. Multinational firms tried to strengthen their posi-
tion vis-a-vis their Mexican partners in various ways. Some Ame-^
rican firms, for example, dispersed widely their Mexican equity
participation over the stock market (acciones pulverizadas) (Sig-
mund, 1984, p. 255). Mexican dummy owners (prestanombres) were
also frequently used to avoid an effective Mexican majority. This
illegal practice is seldom checked and never punished. Within
pyramid schemes (piramidaci6n) foreign investors try to increase
their influence by holding a minority participation in their
2
Mexican partner (Geis, 1986, pp. 157-58) .
The effects of Mexican policies on the sectoral distribution of
fdi can be assessed by referring to available data for 1979. The
importance of fdi across sectors was positively associated with
Small and medium-sized investors must not have a net worldwide
turnover of more than US$ 8 million, employ more than 500 per-
sons internationally and 250 in Mexico. The sales in Mexico are
not allowed to exceed a certain index and at least 35 per cent
of the production has to be exported (CNIE, 1988b, pp. 77-80).
2
Foreign development banks such as the Deutsche Entwicklungs-
gesellschaft can also be embraced. Since their contribution is
regarded as being neutral, the foreign investor can avoid a
Mexican majority without holding more than 49 per cent of the
capital. However, the empirical relevance of development banks
participating in joint ventures has so far remained negligible.11
the level of nominal protection . Import substitution policies
created attractive investment opportunities within Mexico. How-
ever, this policy induced allocation of fdi did non lead to effi-
cient investments from a macroeconomic perspective. Consequently,
no significantly positive effects of fdi on economic growth in
Mexico were to be expected. The relationship between fdi inflows
and economic growth was further weakened by the approval proce-
dures for fdi which served to limit competition among firms with-
in Mexico. On one hand a possible crowding out of Mexican firms
by foreign investors was avoided: Fdi was not permitted if simi-
lar activities were already performed by Mexican firms. On the
other hand multinational firms having invested in Mexico could
enjoy rents created by protection, since they were also protected
from other foreign investors. In sum, possible efficiency gains
from fdi were minimized. Neither were foreign investors forced to
behave efficiently within Mexico nor could they exert competitive
pressure on Mexican firms.
As with many other laws in Mexico, the content of the fdi . legis-
lation is substantially modified by its application. The CNIE
initially followed a hard line applying the new fdi law strictly.
However, as bureaucratic delays created backlogs of as much as
seven months, the administration was reorganized in early 1978 by
appointing a new executive secretary with far reaching responsi-
bilities (Sigmund, 1984, p. 253). Thereafter, the CNIE was usual-
ly processing applications within 30 days and the ownership
structure was handled more flexible. Mexicanization was no longer
the principal aim. The restrictive legislation was rather used to
influence the type of fdi being made (Geis, 1986, p. 66). Job
creation, investment in priority areas and export promotion be-
came most important.
Recently further changes occurred towards a more liberal appli-
cation of the fdi legislation. In 1984 new general guidelines
were published by the CNIE. Foreign majority participation was
allowed in 34 priority industries (GTZ, 1988, pp. 45-46). Fur-
The results are derived from unpublished World Bank data.12
thermore, the previously issued resolutions of the CNIE have been
evaluated and revised (CNIE, 1988a, p. 51). The new system of
resolutions was finally published in February 1988. Additional
measures were taken and are planned for the future, in order to
make the decision process of the CNIE more transparent and less
susceptible to arbitrary judgements. A first step has been to
install a data bank (SIPRE), which includes the previous deci-
sions on fdi applications of approximately 1500 cases (CNIE,
1988b, pp. 109-113).
In the 1980s debt-equity swaps have played an important role in
inducing fdi inflows into Mexico. Capitalization of private debt
has been allowed since 1982 (Geis, 1986, p. 104). Until the end
of 1985 a volume of US$ 769 million was approved, accounting for
30 per cent of all fdi authorizations during that period (BIC,
1987, p. 51). In 1986 the authorities started a codified swap
program embracing public debt. While the discount on public debt
in the secondary market fluctuated between 40 and 50 per cent in
the period June 1986 to September 1987 (Huss, 1988, p. 37), the
redemption discount applied by the Secretaria de Hacienda depends
on the type of investment. The discount varies between zero for
the purchase of "paraestatales" and 25 per cent for investments,
which do not provide specific benefits to the Mexican economy
2
(for details see Table A4) . The program is not open to nationals
and the shares of the realized investments cannot be transferred
to national investors within a 12-year holding period. Swaps
executed amounted to US$ 363 million in 1986 and to US$ 1483
2
million in 1987 (Banco de Mexico, 1988a, p. 50) .
Foreign investors seem to have responded to the shift towards a
more flexible and somewhat less bureaucratic treatment of fdi .
Assuming a 42 per cent discount in the secondary market, a 90
per cent redemption in pesos and subtracting fees, the net bene-
fit to the investors turns out to be 33 per cent (BIC, 1987, p.
61).
2
The swap scheme was suspended temporarily in February/March 1987
during Mexico's debt refinancing deal and once again in November
1987.
For a more rigorous test of this hypothesis, see Appendix 1.des institutslur Weltwirtschaft
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Over the period 1973-77 the inflow of fdi fluctuated around US$
620 million (Graph 1). From 1978 onwards, however, it increased
steadily reaching US$ 2541 million in 1981. The subsequent de-
cline cannot be attributed to changes in the regulative environ-
ment, but rather to the uncertainty and economic recession caused
by the Mexican debt crisis. The possibilities of capitalizing
foreign debt and of swapping debt for equity played an important
role in attracting new fdi after 1982. After dropping to US$ 391
million in 1984, fdi inflows increased steadily to more than US$
1800 million in 1987.
All in all, Mexican government policies exerted a significant in-
fluence on fdi. Besides limiting the total volume of fdi inflows,
the regulations permitted only those foreign investments which
were complementary to Mexican investments. Consequently, a posi-
tive impact of fdi inflows on the investment ratio was to be
expected. However, the approval procedures in combination with
import substitution policies reduced the incentives for foreign
investors to behave efficiently, thereby weakening the relation-
ship between fdi and economic growth.
Graph 1 - Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 1966-87
Mill. US-$ Net Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico
2800 n
1966 68 70' 12 1U 76 78 80 82 84 86
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues14
b. Debt Inflows
In the case of Mexico, the public sector, i.e. state agencies and
public enterprises, accounted for two thirds to three fourth of
Mexico's external debt. Indirectly, the government influenced
private external borrowing as well. Due to the public sector's
demand for domestic savings, private enterprises were crowded out
in national financial markets. The effects on private external
indebtedness are analyzed after the policy framework for public
debt has been discussed.
Public Debt
External borrowing of "paraestatal" firms and government agencies
in Mexico was de facto not restricted before the 1982 crisis.
While a law required the firms and agencies to obtain permission
before contracting foreign debt, foreign credits were taken up
freely in practice and ex post approval was given. Only since
1983 the inflow of public credit is strictly controlled.
With no entry barriers the inflow of public debt was mainly de-
termined by the public deficit and the shortage in domestic
funds. Both presidents, Echeverria (1970-76) and Lopez-Portillo
(1976-82), pursued an expansionary fiscal policy (Carvounis,
1984, p. 101). Public sector revenues were, however, insufficient
to finance these expenditures. Especially in the second half of
the 1970s, public firms were short of financial funds as they
were not allowed to increase their tariffs in an inflationary
environment (Quijano, Antia, 1985, pp. 96-99). In addition, the
current deficit of the federal government accounted on average
for 4.5 per cent of GDP in the 1973-82 period, peaking at 10.9
per cent in 1982 (Table A5).
Public deficits absorbed a significant proportion of available
domestic resources (Table A5) even when deficits were relatively
low. This was because financial intermediation was reduced con-
tinuously. Broad money as a percentage of GDP declined from 21.4
Includes currency held by the public, private checking accounts
in pesos and foreign currency, saving deposits, time deposits,
various short-term certificates.15
per cent in 1970 to 11.8 per cent in 1986. Consequently, the
public sector resorted increasingly to external funds to cover
its deficit. It increased its net external debt on average by
more than US$ 3 billion per annum over the 1973-1987 period
(Table 1), so that total debt reached US$ 103.5 billion in 1987
(Table 2). With falling oil prices in 1981 and the necessary cuts
in public expenditures not being implemented, a record inflow of
US$ 19 billion, mainly short-term debt, was necessary to finance
imports and reserves of the central bank (Kim, 1986, p. 3).
The external financing of current public expenditure is likely to
have affected the economic performance effects of public debt
inflows in the Mexican case. Debt inflows that were used to cover
operating losses of inefficient public enterprises, for example,
weakened the relationship between public debt inflows and Mexi-
co's investment ratio. Particularly in 1976 and in 1981-83 public
debt inflows were above the average (Table 1). However, the ratio
of public investment to GDP was lower than in years with
significantly lower public debt inflows (Table A5). Moreover,
there is reason to suppose that even the share of public debt
which was invested contributed only moderately to economic
growth. In the 1975-81 period, almost 45 per cent of public debt
inflows accrued to the state-owned oil company (PEMEX). PEMEX
used the foreign funds for investments in fixed assets for oil
exploration, exploitation and the like (Ortiz, Bueno, 1988) .
While the investments were profitable initially, asset expansion
continued even when international interest rates rose and the
probability of falling oil prices grew. PEMEX reached a critical
situation in the years 1980/81, when sales and earnings became
incompatible with the volumes of assets and debt having been
accumulated. The overexpansion of PEMEX's capacity points to a
significant misallocation of resources which affected economic
growth prospects negatively.
In the late 1970s PEMEX did no longer invest most of the for-
eign funds, as the non-oil public sector used PEMEX increasing-
ly as a conduct for external borrowing (Luke, 1988, p. 63).16
Table 1 - The Structure of Capital Inflows into Mexico, 1970-87
(Mill. US-Dollar)




Debt 802 4071 5814 3614 4079 5667 11985 28673 9683 8773 625 532 1058 3066
(2) - Public 401 3067 5165 3481 3352 3493 4055 19148 6769 6829 2819 2702 3271 6056
(3) - Private 401 1004 649 133 726 2175 7929 9525 2914 1944 -2194 -2170 -2213 -2990
(4) Direct
Invest-
ment 304 582 628 556 829 1335 2184 2541 1644 456 391 502 895 1892
2.6 7.0 9.3 6.5 4.9 4.2 5.5 11.3 5.9 19.2 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.6
(3)/(4) 1.3 1.7 1.0 0.2 0.9 1.6 3.6 3.7 1.8 4.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Banco de Mexico (1988b); IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues; Quijano, Antia (1985);
p. Ill; Secretaria de Hacienda (1988); own calculations.
Table 2 - Public and Private External Debt in Mexico, 1970-87
1970-72 1973-75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total Debt
(Mill. US$) 6809 14896 25724 29338 33417 39084 51069 79742 89425 98198 98823 99355 100413 103479
Thereof:
- Public 67.9 70.1 75.5 78.1 78.6 76.1 66.2 66.4 66.8 67.8 70.2 72.5 75.0 78.7
- Private 32.1 29.9 24.5 21.9 21.4 23.9 33.8 33.6 33.2 32.2 29.8 27.5 25.0 21.3
Thereof:
- Banks n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.1 44.3 32.3 34.8 35.9 35.4 35.6 40.6
- Firms n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 63.9 55.7 67.7 65.2 64.1 64.6 64.4 59.4
and In-
dividuals
Source: See Table 1; own calculations.17
Notwithstanding its inefficient use Mexico could satisfy its
demand for public external debt due to the proximity to the Uni-
ted States and the oil boom. Under Lopez-Portillo, Mexico expan-
ded its oil production enormously. The earnings from oil exports
and the amount of oil reserves facilitated Mexico's access to
credits from multinational banks, including credits from smaller
American banks. The banks obviously did not evaluate the effi-
ciency of the projects to be financed. Instead almost any public
borrower was thought to be creditworthy and no obligations as how
to use the credits were made.
According to some authors (Casar, Ros, 1988) public external debt
and domestic disintermediation are a reflection of the "inter-
national recycling" of Mexican flight capital. Depending on es-
timation procedures Mexican assets in foreign countries, mainly
the US, increased from US$ 5 billion in 1975 to US$ 42 - 70 bil-
lion in 1985 (Casar, Ros, 1988, p. 18). This flight money was
then relent by international banks to the Mexican public sector.
Private Debt
Until 1978 the inflows of private debt were rather low (Table
1) . However, following the implementation of the Global Plan for
Development in 1979, the private sector contracted some US$ 20
billion of new foreign debt over the next three years, thereby
tripling total private external debt outstanding. Since 1984 the
private sector repayed each year foreign credits worth more than
US$ 2 billion annually. The repayment has been facilitated by the
1983 introduction of an exchange insurance program called FICORCA
It seems that in the beginning of the seventies mainly foreign
enterprises operating in Mexico had access to foreign credits:
they accounted for 89 per cent of the net external debt inflow
to private firms in 1970-1973 (Quijano, Antia, 1985, p. 114).
While in 1974-75 both types of firms took advantage of the
lower financing costs in the US (Table 3), in 1976 following
the devaluation only multinational enterprises imported further
credits.18
(Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos Cambiarios) . Small
firms repayed their credits directly. Large enterprises capi-
talized part of their foreign debt and, especially in 1987,
2
swapped it for foreign equity participation .
In the whole period under consideration (1970-87) the access of
the private sector to foreign financing has never been regulated.
This is also documented by the fact that private foreign debt had
not even been registered systematically before 1982 . Rather than
restricting the entry of private foreign debt, the government
encouraged the inflow mainly via the crowding out of private
enterprises in the domestic financial market and its interest and
exchange rate policies.
The increasing absorption of domestic financial resources by the
public sector implied that private firms had to finance their
investments abroad. This explains why the private investment
ratio hardly increased in the late 1970s, in spite of massive
debt inflows: The inflow of foreign debt to the private sector
increased by 2.5 percentage points of GDP from 1979 to 1980-81
while the private investment ratio augmented by less than, one
percentage point. To the larger part, foreign finance was sub-
stituted for domestic finance.
The scarcity of domestic funds did not induce private firms to
refrain from investments, because foreign credits were artifici-
Private debt covered by FICORCA reached some US$ 11.5 billion.
Basically FICORCA requires that the debt had to be contracted
prior to December 20th, 1982 and is long-term (or restructured
into long-term). FICORCA then swaps the Dollar-obligation into
a loan denominated in Pesos with the same maturity. However, in
an inflationary economy overquick amortization of the real
value of the credit may strain the participating firms. There-
fore, the repayment schedule is constructed to keep the real
value of the repayments constant (Zedillo, 1983).
2
In 1986 Mexico tried to restructure the majority, of its private
debt including a relending obligation for the international
banks over the next 20 years. The latter institutions reacted
quickly by offering Mexican private debtors substantial dis-
counts for early repayments. This led to substantial capital
outflows (Banco de Mexico, 1988a, pp. 49-50).
The data has, therefore, to be interpreted with care.19
ally cheapened. During the years 1970-75 Mexico maintained a
fixed exchange rate and domestic lending rates were significantly
higher than in the United States (Table 3). After the 1976 de-
valuation Mexico again sustained a relative stable exchange rate.
Domestic interest rates were kept at relatively high levels to
avoid further disintermediation, so that the interest rate dif-
ferential again favoured the import of foreign debt. In addition,
the Banco de Mexico offered private debtors an exchange insurance
program . However, up to 1982 the private sector rarely used the
exchange insurance program, as the central bank was perceived of
being able to support the exchange rate endlessly. Hence, even as
late as 1982 with the devaluation pending, only 10 per cent of
total private debt was covered.
The effects of Mexican exchange and interest rate policies were
twofold. They encouraged the private sector to borrow abroad but
discouraged the efficient use of the borrowed funds. Real inter-
est rates on loans in US-Dollar were negative for Mexican borro-
wers during most of the years in the 1972-1984 period (Table 3),
so that the incentives to use the foreign credits for income
generating activities were reduced. By assuming the exchange
risk, the public sector released private debtors from making
costly provisions for exchange rate changes and from investing in
activities which generate foreign exchange.
The shift towards external debt finance was also facilitated by
the concentration in the industrial sector. Foreign banks prefer
to deal with one large "grupo" than with hundreds of small firms.
In 1981 ten Mexican "grupos" accounted for 34.4 per cent of total
private foreign debt outstanding. The largest one, ALFA, contrac-
ted 11 per cent of total private foreign debt (Quijano, Antia,
2
1985, p. 129) . Efficiency, however, need not to be positively
associated with economic size. Hence, the advantage of large
firms in contracting foreign debt may not have led to an effi-
cient allocation of foreign credits among Mexican private firms.
The program started with a back-to-back (credit-deposit) system
and after a few months also swaps could be performed.
2
Recently ALFA swapped debt worth 920 million US-dollar into a
45 per cent equity stake (BIC, 1987, p. 53).20

























































































aLending rate for 1978-84; as no lending rates are available
before 1978, the average difference between lending and deposit
rates over the years 1978-80 has been added to the deposit rates
for 1970-77. - Prime rate corrected for the ex-post devaluation
of the Peso against the US-Dollars. - Annual change in the
consumer price index.
Source: Banco de Mexico, unpublished material; IMF (1987); own
calculations.21
IV. The Structure of External Financing and Economic Performance
From the preceding analysis of government policies towards capi-
tal inflows it can be concluded that the Mexican authorities
strongly influenced the amount, the structure and the efficiency
of capital inflows. The government's absorption of domestic
savings induced private enterprises to refer to foreign capital
markets. Public enterprises financed operating deficits external-
ly. It is thus to be expected that the impact of debt inflows on
overall investment and growth remained limited. With respect to
fdi inflows the regulations tried to avoid a possible crowding
out of Mexican investors. However, fdi policies discouraged an
efficient use of foreign capital and were thus likely to have
weakened the impact on economic growth. In the following hypo-
theses on the impact of capital inflows on economic performance
in Mexico are subjected to an empirical test.
1. Specification of Hypotheses
Using yearly observations for the 1967-86 period, the following
equation was estimated:
(3) X = a0 + a1 FDI + a2 AID + a3 DEBT
The endogenous variables being explained in separate regressions
were the investment ratio (I/GDP), the domestic savings ratio
(DS/GDP), and real annual growth of GDP (GR). The set of explana-
tory variables included foreign direct investment flows into
Mexico (FDI), aid, and total debt inflows. The exogenous vari-
ables were expressed as a percentage of GDP.
According to the theoretical framework outlined above, a non-co-
operative equilibrium in the case of debt and a cooperative solu-
tion for fdi inflows require the following pattern of the estima-
ted coefficients.
(4) a2 <; a3, 3l22
In addition, individual coefficients should satisfy the following
constraints:
(5) a) -1 <, ao £ 0 when the endogenous variable is DS/GDP,
b) 0 <, a2 £ 1 when the endogenous variable is I/GDP,
c) a2 £ 0 when the endogenous variable is GR,
d) a, £ 0 when the endogenous variable is I/GDP or GR.
Multiple regression analysis was used to reveal whether these
constraints have to be rejected. Alternatively, F-tests were em-
ployed to test the competing hypothesis that different types of









The importance of discriminating among capital inflows was evalu-
ated by making pair-wise comparisons:
(7) a) a1 = a2
b) «x = a3
c) a2 = a3
Further tests were performed by differentiating between different
types of debt inflows. First, it was hypothesized that the impact
of debt inflows depends on the type of the capital recipient.
Private agents were expected to use credits more productively
than the government sector. Private debt (DEBT-Pr) should, there-
fore, have a larger impact on investment and growth than public
debt (DEBT-Gv). At the same time a possible substitution effect
between domestic savings and debt inflows would be relatively
smaller in the case of private debt. The estimated equation was
then:23
(8) X = bQ + b1 FDI + t>2 AID + h>3 DEBT-Gv + b^ DEBT-Pr.
With respect to individual coefficients the following constraints
were expected to hold:
(9) b2 £ blt b3, b4; and b3 £ b^.
The restriction (9) embodied both, the test of the two regimes




e complete restriction as well as pair-wise
comparisons of coefficients were tested by applying F-tests.
The influence of debt inflows could also depend on the type of
lender, especially whether credits were provided by official
sources (DEBT-Mu) or private lenders (DEBT-Ba). Typically,
credits from official sources were concessionary. Lower than
market interest rates reduced future repayment obligations. This
could have weakened the incentive to use debt efficiently.
(10) X = cQ + c1 FDI + c2 AID + c3 DEBT-Mu + c^ DEBT-Ba.
The coefficients were expected to obey the following pattern:
(11) c2 £ c^, c3, c^ and c3 £ c^.
2. The Data Base and Methodological Remarks
The main data sources are balance of payments statistics, natio-
nal external debt statistics and the national accounts. A de-
tailed description of variables and data sources is presented in
Appendix 2. Most of the data cover the 1967-86 period. Hence, the
recent changes in Mexican fdi regulations were only partly in-
corporated in the empirical analysis, since observations for 1987
and 1988 were not available. The disaggregation of debt according
to the type of creditor does not exist in the case of non-guaran-
teed private debt, while in the case of public and publicly gua-
ranteed debt it is only available for the years 1970-86.24
All estimations were initially performed using the ordinary-
least-squares technique. As the results were affected by the
presence of first-order autocorrelation of the residuals, a maxi-
mum-likelihood procedure was applied to correct for autocorrela-
tion.
Two-period-moving averages were used for the capital inflow vari-
ables. This is mainly because the impact of capital inflows on
economic performance is unlikely to be fully realized in the year
when inflows are reported. A lagged impact is most likely when
economic growth is the dependent variable . Capital inflows which
influence current investment are supposed to affect economic
growth in the next period when output-increasing effects of in-
vestment materialize. Hence, capital inflows were lagged one
period in the case of the growth equation.
3. Empirical Results
The values of the coefficients obtained from estimating equation
(3) for the 1967-86 period are given in Table 4. Due to the in-
significance of most of the capital inflow variables, the hypo-
theses concerning the relative size of the coefficients can nei-
ther be confirmed nor rejected. Similarly, the overall fit of,the
equations is relatively low. This can be attributed to multi-
collinearity and neglected explaining variables. Both factors
require to reformulate the equation specification:
- A Pearson-correlation coefficient of 0.72 between FDI and DEBT
indicates a relatively high multicollinearity. The undesirable
consequence is that the variances of the estimated parameters
of the collinear variables are relatively large. Statistically
insignificant coefficients are thus to be expected. The col-
linearity among both variables is substantially reduced, if the
estimation period is shortened to 1967-81 . This is a reason-
able procedure, since from 1982 onwards the scarcity of foreign
finance contrasts sharply with the situation in the preceding
period.
For the period 1967-81 period the Pearson-correlation coeffi-
cient is only 0.51.25
Table 4 - Impact of Capital Inflows on Investment, Savings and





















































Standard errors in parentheses. - *Significant at the 10 per cent
level. **Significant at the 5 per cent level. ***Significant at the
1 per cent level.
Source: Banco de Mexico (1988b); IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics,
various issues; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial
Flows to Developing Countries, various issues; Quijano, Antia
(1985); Secretaria de Hacienda (1988); Secretaria de
Programacion y Presupuesto, Anuario Estadistico, various
issues; own calculations.
- As concerns missing explanatory variables, the growing import-
ance of oil exploration was particularly relevant for economic
performance of Mexico during the estimation period. This factor
may not be readily incorporated into the underlying model.
Moreover, a comprehensive extension of the equation specifica-
tion is not warranted due to the limited number of observa-
tions. Hence, a trend variable is included as a proxy to
capture the effects of neglected variables.
The reestimation of (3) along the aforementioned lines yields the
results shown in Table 5. The overall fit of all equations
improves considerably though the economic growth equation has a
lower explanatory power than the other two. The relative size of
the coefficients follow the hypothesized pattern in all equati-
ons. The coefficients for FDI(a1) and DEBT(a_) are larger than
the coefficient for AID inflows (a_).26
Table 5 - Impact of Capital Inflows on Investment, Savings and

































GRt+1 0.09*** -2.69 -7.12 -1.38***




DS/GDP 0.08*** 4.77*** -6.45 -0.32***
(0.01) (1.11) (19.61) (0.11)
0.39x10"^*** 0.86 2.50
(0.49x10 )
Standard errors in parentheses. - **Significant at the 5 per cent
level. ***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.
The relatively lower fit of the growth equation is not surpris-
ing, since the underlying model predicts the effects on invest-
ment and domestic savings in the first place. The relationship
with real economic growth relies on the assumption that growth is
a function of lagged investment. In the case of Mexico, however,
this,relationship is less obvious. The Pearson-correlation coef-
ficient between growth and the lagged investment ratio is -0.11
over the estimation period. This is a consequence of Mexican
development policies. The protection from foreign competition and
the regulative framework which reduced competitive pressures
further allowed firms in Mexico to realize individually profit-
able investments, though they hardly contributed to the economic
growth of the country.
These policies can also reconcile the differing effects of. fdi on
the investment ratio and the economic growth rate. The positive
influence of fdi on overall investment indicates that government
regulations successfully avoided a crowding-out of domestic in-
vestors. However, more foreign direct investment did not lead to
higher economic growth, since the approval procedures for fdi and
import substitution policies reduced the incentive for foreign
investors to behave efficiently.27
Government policies figure prominently in explaining the negative
and statistically significant coefficient for debt inflows in the
growth and savings equation as well. The former result conflicts
with the model constraint 5d, which implies a positive coeffici-
ent for debt inflows in the first two equations . The easy access
to foreign credits in Mexico and their low costs impaired the
incentives to accumulate domestic savings and to use the funds
productively. External credits were raised to cover operating
losses and to finance consumption expenditures. This is also
documented by the fact that debt inflows had no positive impact
on the investment ratio.
Comparisons of coefficient values within individual equations are
of limited value, since in each equation the coefficient for at
least one capital inflow variable remains insignificant. The
alternative hypothesis according to which economic performance
effects are the same for different types of capital inflows may
be tested instead. The equations of Table 5 were reestimated
including the restrictions (5) and (6). The results were then
compared to the unrestricted estimates in Table 5 using a stand-
ard F-test procedure. Most notably, the hypothesis that all capi-
tal inflows have the same impact is rejected in all equations but
the growth equation (Table 6). Equity between any pair of coeffi-
cients is also denied if I/GDP is the endogenous variable. In the
savings equation, the hypothesis postulating equal coefficients
between debt and fdi inflows is rejected.
In the next step total debt inflows are disaggregated into cred-
its accruing to the private and to the public sector. The results
in Table 7 show that the distinction did not improve the overall
fit of the regressions significantly. With respect to size and
statistical significance of the coefficients the main results of
Table 5 still hold. The coefficients for both types of debt in-
flows are negative and statistically significant if the endoge-
Restriction 5b is also rejected, since the coefficient for the
AID-variable is negative and statistically significant in the
investment equation.28

















































Estimated Equation: X = a. + a^^ FDI + a. AID + a. DEBT + a.
TREND. - A * indicates that the restriction is rejected at the 5
per cent level of significance.
Source: See Table 4, own calculations.
















I/GDP 0.15*** 6.24** -68.91** -0.18 0.33 0.32xl0~i?*** 0.89 2.69
(0.02) (2.19) (23.20) (0.15) (0.32) (0.58x10 )
GR 0.08*** -1.36 -5.37 -1.34*** -1.74** 0.55xl0~^*** 0.71 2.88
(0.03) (3.07) (31.79) (0.21) (0.56) (0.80x10 )
DS/GDP 0.06*** 7.14*** -4.57 -0.24** -0.72** 0.40xl0~^*** 0.89 2.46
(0.01) (1.52) (16.20) 0.10 0.23 (0.39x20 )
Standard errors in parentheses. - **Significant at the 5 per
cent level. ***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.29
nous variable is GR or DS/GDP. The hypothesis of a more favour-
able impact of private debt inflows (b. >_ b_) has to be rejected.
Most notably, private borrowers appear to have used foreign debt
as a substitute for domestic savings to a larger extent than
public borrowers . According to the constraint tests presented in
Table A6, however, the hypothesis of equal coefficients for pri-
vate and public debt inflows is accepted for all three endogenous
variables. Hence, the impact of both debt inflows on economic
performance is not different in a statistically significant
sense. As concerns debt inflows, the model assumption holds that
the government agent determines the effects of both public and
private debt.
The estimation period has to be modified when evaluating the
different effects of debt provided by private and public credi-
tors. Since data on the type of creditor is not available before
1970, a shortening of the period to 1970-1981 would not leave
enough observations. Thus, the estimation period is extended to
1970-1986. This does not cause severe problems of multicolli-
nearity, as the disaggregation of debt inflows reduces the colli-
2
nearity with fdi inflows . T.
(10) are reported in Table 8.
2
nearity with fdi inflows . The results of estimating equations
The hypothesis that debt from private sources (DEBT-Ba) has a
more favourable impact on economic performance than debt from
official sources (DEBT-Mu) can neither be confirmed nor rejected.
In each equation only one type of debt inflow is statistically
significant. Alternatively, . an F-test can be used to analyse
whether the coefficients for both types of debt inflows are dif-
ferent in a statistically significant way. While the negative
coefficient for debt inflows from private sources in the in-
vestment equation is unexpected, the F-test reveals that no sta-
tistically significant difference exists between both types of
The insignificant estimates in the investment equation make a
comparison not meaningful.
2
Over the period 1970-86 the Pearson-correlation coefficients
between FDI-inflows and debt from official and from private
sources equal -0.07 and 0.41 respectively.30









I/GDP 0.15*** 10.23*** -151.72*** 0.50 -0.60** 0.40xl0~^*** 0.86 2.17




48.76 -39.38*** 1.28 -0.57xl0~^*** 0.70 2.46




31.71 -12.21*** 0.23 0.35x10
 2*** 0.77 2.48
(32.66) (2.70) (0.22) (0.60x10 )
Standard errors in parentheses. - **Significant at the 5 per
cent level. ***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.
debt inflows (Table A7). The negative influence of debt from
official sources on economic growth and domestic savings is not
surprising. The grant element included in these credits has ob-
viously further reduced the incentives to use the resources
productively. For the latter two equations the importance of
distinguishing debt inflows from different sources is reflected
in the constraint tests: Restricting both debt inflows to equal
coefficients is rejected for .the growth and savings equation.
Finally, the hypothesis that all capital inflows have the same
influence is rejected for all three endogenous variables.31
V. Summary and Conclusions
The empirical analysis of Mexico's economic performance in re-
sponse to different capital inflows clearly points to the im-
portance of distinguishing between debt and equity inflows. Fdi
inflows had a positive impact on the savings and investment
ratio. The investment response to debt inflows was weak, while
even a negative and statistically significant relationship was
found between domestic savings and debt inflows.
The analysis of the Mexican case also reveals some weaknesses of
the underlying principal-agent model as presented in Chapter II.
In particular, the assumption that different capital inflows are
perfectly fungible does not seem to be warranted in the case of
Mexico. Government regulations discriminated between debt and
equity inflows. While debt inflows were completely unregulated
until 1982, regulations restricted the total inflow of fdi and
its allocation within the Mexican economy. Specifically, fdi was
not permitted in the growing oil industry so that its growth had
to be financed by external debt. Government policies induced
foreign principals to engange in different transfer regimes for
debt and equity inflows.
The regulative framework is also important in explaining the
impact of debt and equity inflows on investment and growth. Fdi
regulations and general development policies avoided a crowding-
out of domestic investors by foreign firms, but limited competi-
tion in Mexico and thus did not lead to efficient investments.
The impact of fdi on economic growth remained insignificant. The
easy access to foreign funds induced public and private borrowers
to spend the funds for inefficient investments, capital flight
and consumption. The socialization of exchange rate risks, arti-
ficially low interest rates for Dollar-credits and the renewed
access to foreign credits supported inefficient uses.32
Several conclusions emerge from these findings for future Mexican
policies. Since the amount of fdi inflows responds positively to
a more liberal regulative environment, the recently begun de-
regulation should be continued. The impact of these policy
changes on economic performance in Mexico has not been captured
by the empirical analysis. It can, however, be supposed that a
larger volume of fdi will contribute to economic growth in Mexico
only if other policies are revised as well. In particular, com-
petition should be allowed between foreign and domestic firms in
order to reduce inefficiences. Moreover, the recent reduction in
the level of import protection should be continued and intensi-
fied . The pressure exerted by foreign competitors forces multi-
national as well as domestic firms operating in Mexico to ratio-
nalize production in order to restore or strenghten international
competitiveness.
While at present no voluntary bank lending is available for Mexi-
co, the results stress the importance of changes in the Mexican
exchange rate policy. A floating rate regime seems best suited to
avoid an overvaluation of the Peso and artificially low costs of
foreign credits. Exchange risk insurances should not be costless.
Particularly external borrowing of the public sector should be
evaluated more closely ex ante. Economic reforms encouraging a
more efficient use of external debt are most important in order
to overcome the disincentive effects inherent in non-cooperative
situations. The institutional framework of international capital
transfers is not conducive to a credible precommitment of agents
to a certain investment behaviour (Nunnenkamp, 1988; Stiiven,
1988). It depends on the principals' expectations on the future
economic course of the agent whether or not they set cooperative
terms for capital transfers. Mexico can influence these expecta-
tions by economic reforms which make a productive and less risky
use of foreign debt more likely. Again import liberalization and
increasing competitive pressures figure prominently. Furthermore,
In 1987 the maximum tariff rate was reduced to 20 per cent,
import licenses were no longer required for many items, and
official minimum prices for imports were abolished (IMF, 1988).33
a reduction in public deficits is required by cutting public
consumption and inefficient investment projects.
Finally, the empirical analysis suggests that the effects of the
institutional framework on the relationship between economic per-
formance and capital inflows should be incorporated in the prin-
cipal-agent model. This may be achieved by accounting for the
existence of different agents within the capital recipient coun-
try and their relations with each other. The predictive power of
the model could be improved, since the incentive structure as how
to use foreign funds differs between the government, private deb-
tors and private investors.34
Appendix 1
Impact of Government Policies on Fdi inflows
The discussion of.policies towards fdi in Mexico indicated that
government-imposed restrictions influenced fdi inflows into Mexi-
co. Host country incentives and disincentives are not the only
determinants of fdi flows . Especially market size, business risk
and expected profitability influence the locational decision of
multinational enterprises as well. Nevertheless, a recent survey
among US-based multinationals engaged in Latin American revealed
that "the rules of the game" were an important determinant in
2
their investment decision . Specifically, an improvement in the
regulative environment was said to have a strong influence on
future investment decisions.
A simple model was constructed in order to test the hypothesis
that changes in the fdi legislation and its application influ-
enced inflows of fdi. As concerns the supply of fdi, it was
assumed that multinational enterprises based their investment
decision mainly on expected profits. Expected profitability of
investing in Mexico was proxied by the real growth of gross do-
mestic product (GR._1) of the preceding period. Hence, adaptive
expectations were assumed. Lagging GR avoided problems of simul-
taneity, since the current economic growth could be influenced by
current fdi inflows . Demand factors were represented by Mexico's
attitude towards fdi. More liberal regulations were assumed to
indicate Mexico's desire to attract additional fdi inflows.
Changes in the regulative environment were measured by an index
(REG). Increasing values of REG were assigned to fdi liberaliza-
tion such as a more flexible handling of fdi applications and the
introduction of debt-equity swaps (see Table A2). Finally, it had
On the relevance of home and host country incentives see also
Agarwal (1986).
2
See the 1986 survey of the Council of the Americas quoted in
Dahlmann (1987).
See Section IV.1 of this paper.35
to be considered that investments are usually long-term commit-
ments which may require continuous fdi inflows in consecutive
periods. According to this rationale lagged fdi inflows were











Equation (12) was estimated with annual observations for the
1973-87 period using the ordinary-least-squares technique. Since
the regression included the lagged dependent variable, the Dur-
bin-Watson d-test for autocorrelation was inappropriate. Instead
Durbin's h-test was calculated. The critical value at the 5 per
cent level is 1.96. The results are given in Table Al.










variable aQ a- a_ a, h
FDI -482.2 72.4* 321.7* 0.53** 0.50 1.74
Z (476.8) (39.6) (161.7) (0.21)
Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 10 per cent
level. **Significant at the 5 per cent level.
Source: Banco de Mexico (1988a). IMF, Balance of Payments Statis-
tics, various issues; Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presu-
puesto, Anuario Estadistico, various issues; own calcula-
tions .
The overall fit of the equation is reasonable; the hypothesis
that there is no positive first-order autocorrelation cannot be
rejected at the 5 per cent level. The empirical results confirm
the expected relationships. An increase in the overall real
growth rate affects the inflow of fdi positively. Similarly,
foreign direct investments are obviously long-term commitments so
that the fdi inflows of the preceding period trigger a certain36
volume of current fdi inflows. An improvement in the regulative
environment increases the inflow of fdi. Although the construc-
tion of the regulation index involves arbitrary judgements, it
seems safe to conclude that a further liberalization of the fdi
legislation in Mexico would attract new investments.
Table A2 - Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico,
1973-87






























Promulgation of LIE (Law to Promote
Mexican and Regulate Foreign Invest-
ment)
Reorganisation and simplification
of approval procedure; more flexible
application of LIE thereafter
Debt capitalization allowed
Majority investments in priority
sectors possible






The Balance of Payments Statistics published by the International
Monetary Fund were the source for inflows of foreign direct
investment:
FDI: FDI inflows consist of foreign direct investments in
Mexico. The fdi data do not include credits, which
multinational enterprises extend to their subsidiaries.
These credits are included in debt inflows.
Three sources were used to derive a series of public and publicly
guaranteed and non-guaranteed private debt inflows: Banco de
Mexico (1988c); Quijano, Antia (1985); Secretaria de Hacienda y
Credito Publico (1988):
DEBT-Pr: Annual change in private, non-guaranteed debt out-
standing.
DEBT-Gv: Annual change in public and publicly guaranteed debt
outstanding.
DEBT: Sum of DEBT-Pr and DEBT-Gv.
Public sector debt inflows according to the type of creditor are
taken from the World Debt Tables published by the World Bank:
DEBT-Mu: Consists of net flows of public and publicly guaranteed
debt from official sources such as multilateral and
bilateral agencies, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development and IDA.
DEBT-Ba: Net debt inflows from private sources include public
and publicly guaranteed credits from suppliers and
financial markets and private, non-guaranteed debt
(DEBT-Pr).
The Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries issued by the OECD was used for the aid variable:
AID: Consists of grants only.
In the estimations all exogenous variables are expressed as a
share of gross domestic product.
The values for the endogenous variables come from two sources.
For the period 1967-69 the data were taken from Banco de Mexico,
Producto Interno Bruto y Gasto. Thereafter the information is38
derived from Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto de Divisas,
Anuario Estadistico:
GDP: Gross domestic product at current market prices.
I: Gross fixed capital formation.
DS: Domestic savings.
GR: Annual growth rate of real GDP.39
Table A3 - Value Added, Debt and Exports in Selected














































































































371 Basic Iron, Steel Prods.
372 Nonferrous Metal Inds.
384 Transport Equip.
^In per cent of total value added in manufacturing.


























Source: Banco de Mexico (1988b); UNCTAD (1987); United Nations (1983);
World Bank (1988); own calculations.40
Table A4 - Redemption Discounts for Debt-equity Swaps in Mexico
Category Purpose of Investment Discount of face value
(in per cent)
0 Buying state owned companies 0
1 Companies whose production derived from the 5
new investment will be exported to at least
80 per cent; purchase of 100 per cent
foreign owned local firms; small and medium
businesses
2 New businesses and expansion of existing ones 8
with new technology; operations in priority
sectors generating foreign exchange and/or
employment; new production of which at least
50 per cent is exported; investing in
majority foreign-controlled local companies
3 Operations of which at least 30 per cent is 12
destined for export; introduction of state
of the art technology; purchase of local
firms with foreign minority ownership
4 20 per cent of production is exported; 13
purchase of firms with balance-of-payments
problems; intermediate technology
5 Reduction of liabilities with national 14
suppliers; improving a negative balance-of-
payments situation
6 Generate no foreign exchange; partial pre- 15
payment of FICORCA or national credit
institution obligation in Pesos
7 Full prepayment of FICORCA or national 16
credit institution obligation
8 No special benefit to Mexican economy 25
Exchange insurance program (Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos
Cambiarios).
Source: BIC (1987), pp. 56-57.41
Table A5 - Absorption of Domestic Financial Resources by the Government and the
















































































: in the available time series. - Since
opertions are added to the amounts
by Current defi-
cit of the









































the resources lent in























Source: Banco de Mexico, Informal Anual, various issues; Secretaria de Programaci6n y
Presupuesto de Divisas, Anuario Estadistico, various issues.42


















































































DS/GDP F(3,8)= F(l,8)= F(l,8)= F(l,8)= F(l,8)= F(l,8)= F(l,8)=
11.87* 0.51 24.21* 21.21* 0.07 0.06 3.68
Estimated equation: X = bfl + b- FDI + b_ AID + b_ DEBT-Gv + b4
DEBT-Pr + b5 TREND. - A * indicates that the restriction is
rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.



































































DS/GDP F(3,9)= F(l,9)= F(l,9)= F(l,9)=. F(l,9)= F(l,9)= F(l,9)=
7.47* 0.91 19.78* 0.18x10 1.68 0.94 19.29*
Estimated equation: X = c_ + c^ FDI + c2 AID + c_ DEBT-Mu
c. DEBT-Ba + c_ TREND. - A * indicates that the restriction is
rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance.
Source: See Table 4; own calculations.43
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